Illinois Global Review


"Hallmarks of Genocide:" Sudan's Rapid Support Forces

By Will Pujol
March 26, 2026

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“They raped me. They degraded us, they tortured us… In front of me, they killed a woman. My daughter screamed and ran” – Survivor from El-Fasher

In April of 2023, Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces began a bloody civil war. It is yet another power struggle in the North African nation that has left hundreds of thousands dead and millions displaced. Ever since, both sides have been accused of war crimes, including the use of child soldiers, mass sexual violence, and targeting of civilians. Additionally, a recent UN report titled “Hallmarks of Genocide” has stated that the Rapid Support Forces have committed acts in the Darfur that “are indicators of a genocidal path.” This includes “exterminatory rhetoric” leveled against non-Arab Sudanese, particularly the Zaghawa and Fur peoples. The report concluded that “at least three of the material crimes of genocide are overwhelmingly present.” This report, however, only documents a two-day period in October of 2025. It is one of the most recent documentations of what has become an incredibly disturbing pattern of violence committed by the RSF ever since it began this violent campaign in 2023. But many experts on Sudan are not surprised. In fact, when examining the groups that later became the Rapid Support Forces, it is clear that the recent violence in Sudan is not a new development, but the continuation of a historical pattern. So who are the Rapid Support Forces, and why is Sudan’s descent into genocidal violence not particularly surprising?

The Rapid Support Forces have their origins in Janjaweed militias, “an amalgam of diehards from the National Front of the 1970s… Chadian armed groups who had been chased into Darfur in the 1980s, and local Arab militia.” One scholar states that “From the beginning, the distinction between tribal militias and government paramilitaries was blurred.” If the relationship was “blurred” in the 1980s and 90s, it was undeniable by the early 2000s, when rebel groups began forming in Darfur, challenging then-president al-Bashir’s authority. Facing a lack of soldiers, the Sudanese government began arming the Janjaweed, giving them weapons, money, vehicles, and even uniforms. Some Janjaweed defectors even state that the Sudanese government incorporated some of these Janjaweed militants into the Sudanese army, giving them numbers and salaries, in order to avoid accusations that they were arming militant groups. Alex De Waal, one of the foremost scholars of Sudan, put it bluntly, saying of the early 2000s period “the official [Popular Defense Force] and unofficial Janjawiid became indistinguishable.”

Reports of war crimes– from both survivors from the Darfur and former Janjaweed soldiers– came soon after their newfound partnership with the government. One former Janjaweed officer (using the pseudonym ‘Suleiman’), who claims to have met with top Sudanese officials personally, stated that Second Vice President of Sudan Ali Osman Mohammed Taha told him that the government needed the land, and only the land; “we don’t need the people here.” This same officer stated that they attacked “more than 25 villages” by firing at random, saying that women, children, and the elderly were among the victims. Former soldiers report that sexual violence was commonplace, and even compulsory. At least two soldiers indicate that they were ordered to participate in rapes, with one being forced at gunpoint to rape a girl no more than twelve years old, and another being shot after refusing to participate in a gang rape. ‘Suleiman’ indicates that the Sudanese government was made aware of the problem of sexual violence, but that they did nothing. Orders were also given to burn villages, and as ‘Suleiman’ indicates, this was done with the full knowledge and intention that the villagers would not be able to return, saying “when you burn the village, this means you expel the civilians from the village.” One Janjaweed commander, known as Ali Khushayb, was recently sentenced at the ICC for crimes committed during this period. The sentencing judge Joanna Korner stated that he had given orders to “wipe out and sweep away” non-Arab Sudanese and to “bring no one alive.” He is to date the only person sentenced in international court for these crimes.

The Janjaweed were rebranded during an “urgent overhaul” in 2013 by then-president Omar al-Bashir as an official entity under the command of Sudan’s National Intelligence and Security Services, where they became known as the Rapid Support Forces. Al-Bashir placed a former Janjaweed commander Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo Musa, popularly known as Hemedti, at the head, where he has led ever since.

Reports of war crimes soon followed in 2014: mass-looting, torture, rape (including of children), and women being burned alive. The crimes were so horrific that one 19-year-old RSF defector described the group as “men with no mercy.” The violence since 2023 is a mere continuation of these same tactics. In April of 2025, the RSF attacked the Zamzam refugee camp, which was housing internally displaced persons in a siege that lasted three days. Survivors interviewed by Amnesty International indicated that killings were committed indiscriminately, with multiple survivors stating they witnessed mass-executions of people in civilian clothing. But not all killing was indiscriminate; some of it was directed at members of particular ethnic groups. For example, according to one survivor, RSF soldiers asked a disabled man being evacuated “You are Zaghawa, right?” and shot him immediately. Videos also show RSF soldiers saying “hit the abada” and referring to dead bodies as “falang gayaat.” Both terms mean “slave” and according to the UN report “are derogatory slurs linked to the victims’ perceived ethnic identity and political affiliation.”

Sexual violence was also committed on an ethnic basis. A report released by the Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa states that nearly 1,300 women were subjected to sexual and gender-based violence, and some survivors reported that they were asked about their ethnic identity before being subject to sexual violence. Of the over 800 cases where perpetrator information was available, 87% were attributed to RSF soldiers. The UN report also addresses sexual violence, including a case in which 19 women were raped in a room filled with corpses and called “falangiya” (an alternate spelling of falang gayaat). One woman managed to avoid being raped by speaking an Arab dialect and because of her light skin. One of the most horrific instances of sexual violence listed in the report involves a 12-year-old girl gang raped by three RSF soldiers in front of her mother shortly after her father was killed. The girl died before being able to reach a hospital.

One RSF commander has become so notorious that he is being referred to as “the Butcher of El-Fasher.” Brigadier General al-Fateh Abdullah Idris, also known as Abu Lulu, has become well-known around the world for his social media videos depicting his crimes. In multiple videos verified by the BBC, Abu Lulu can be seen shooting unarmed individuals in civilian clothing. Other videos show him standing among dead bodies, meaning that he has participated in– or at least been witness to– hundreds of extrajudicial killings. According to him, though, the number is far higher; Abu Lulu appeared in a TikTok live stream stating that he had killed 2,000 people, but that he had “lost count.” Some RSF-affiliated users responded in the chat calling him a hero. One criminal psychologist interviewed by Al Jazeera says that Abu Lulu’s filming of these videos suggests he views himself as a kind of celebrity; a sort of warlord influencer proudly showing off his kills. RSF spokespeople told Al Jazeera that Abu Lulu is not part of the RSF, but Abu Lulu himself does not seem aware of this; he is seen in one video forcing at least nine captives to chant slogans like “Hemedti is on top” before shooting them all with an AK-47 style rifle. The UN report also addresses Abu Lulu, specifically citing his participation in the massacre at El-Fasher University, where thousands of civilians had sought refuge. Witnesses state he shot indiscriminately along with other RSF soldiers, even clearing rooms for the sole purpose of execution. It even seems that killing was a game to him; two witnesses stated that he asked a pregnant woman how far along she was. When she told him seven months, he shot her in the stomach seven times, killing her. By the end of the university takeover, its buildings were left littered with corpses.

Judge Korner stated that her sentence of Ali Kushayb was meant to serve not just as retribution, but deterrence, especially “given the current state of affairs in Sudan.” It deterred no one, and many experts weren’t surprised: “We knew this was going to happen… We have warned against this for months and months… but the world chose to watch and to do nothing,” said Hamid Khalafallah, a researcher and policy analyst who focuses on Sudan. And now, more than 12 million displaced Sudanese are paying the price of inaction, in addition to the untold thousands who have died.

The RSF has proven since its days as the Janjaweed that it will not stop its crimes so long as it receives support. The activities of genocide of then are virtually the same as they are now; and the RSF’s claims that people like Abu Lulu are not a part of the command structure, but instead is a part of an allied coalition, mean very little when one considers the history of blurred lines between militias like the Janjaweed and state actors like the RSF. If the international community continues to do what it has always done in the Sudanese case, the suffering will continue. One Sudan analyst, Bakry Eljack says “If we don’t do something about this now, this is not going to end in El-Fasher…We have to do everything we can to find a way to get ceasefires,” saying that this should be the top priority for international actors. Eljack and Justin Lynch, a former humanitarian worker in Sudan who co-authored “Sudan’s Unfinished Democracy,” advocate for international pressure on the RSF’s main foreign backer, the United Arab Emirates, who now appears to be funding the training of RSF soldiers by providing “logistical and military supplies” for a training camp in Ethiopia. With violence showing no signs of stopping, the international community must ask itself; will it fail the people of Sudan yet again?

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