Illinois Global Review

It is no secret that since Hungarian president Viktor Orbán entered power in 2010, the nation’s democracy has been fighting a losing battle against democratic backsliding. Orbán has instituted legal constitutional reforms that have greatly hindered democratic competitiveness, gerrymandered districts, and limited the media space, among many other changes, which have led to a decrease in political participation and weakening of the rule of law. His reforms were created explicitly to move Hungary towards an “illiberal” form of democracy, according to his own words during a speech in 2014. Orbán prioritized the “nation” and explicitly sidelined essential liberal democratic principles, including the rule of law, limited state power, and judicial oversight. During this speech, he also took the chance to openly attack NGOs and civil society organizations, claiming that they lie on the “political fringe” and claimed that political activists were “paid by foreigners” and “promoting foreign interests”.

Furthermore, the Hungarian government has become increasingly vocal in its criticisms of the “West” and has continued cozying up to other authoritarian leaders like Vladimir Putin and wannabe authoritarians like Donald Trump. Recently, Hungary has begun blocking popular EU objectives for the sole purpose of hindering EU interests. These blockages include the blocking of loans and aid to Ukraine, sanctions against Russia, and an EU statement on the sovereignty of Greenland. Given these increasingly anti-democratic behaviors from Orbán, the EU has been forced to act. The EU’s strength is found in its members’ commitment to democratic principles and in its ability to act as a single unified entity. It cannot afford to stand by while the situation continues to worsen.

So, the question remains: what can be done to support Hungarian democracy? The EU should make use of the tools at its disposal to promote Hungarian democracy. Existing and utilized examples include the withholding of EU funds until certain concerns are addressed in a substantive manner. The EU can also consider placing other kinds of restrictions on Hungary, such as suspension of status as a member of the Schengen Zone, limiting participation in the European single market and in EU initiatives, or even consider triggering Article 7(2) of the Treaty on Europe Union. Article 7(2) is a particularly useful tool, if deemed proper for the situation, because it would suspend the voting rights of Hungary within EU institutions while still retaining its membership obligations. Article 7(1) has been triggered against Hungary in 2017, though Article 7(1) is meant as a preventative measure, rather than a sanction like Article 7(2). Article 7(2) is much less drastic than the full removal of Hungary from the Union which would bring another set of repercussions. Though it must be stated that the EU should understand that there is a threshold at which, despite all efforts to ensure otherwise, Hungary’s autocratization begins to pose a threat to the democracies of the EU and its member states. Once this threshold is reached, the EU should consider the removal of Hungary from the union. Let it be abundantly clear that this is an option that is, in every sense of the word, undesirable, and should be avoided until it is the last resort. No matter how you spin it, the removal of Hungary from the EU would, first and foremost, mark one of the largest failures of the EU. It would be an abandonment of the Hungarian people and of Hungarian democracy. While it would be a show of force from the EU, that it is forcefully dedicated to its democratic values, its meaning would symbolically damage the united image of the EU and show that it had failed to protect the democracy of one of its own members.

Within Hungary there is work that must be done as well. The first objective must be to bring awareness to the tactics of Orbán and his allies, such as authoritarian legalism. Authoritarian legalism is the process of making changes within a legal framework that, individually, are not illegal or necessarily damaging to democracy, but when coalesced into a bigger picture, are undeniably anti-democratic. The institutions themselves remain identical on the outside; it's the processes within that change, meaning that large parts of the population won’t recognize it without being educated on the topic. One of the ways to fight back against these tactics is through the necessary redevelopment of domestic civil society organizations, which have been subjected to attacks by Orbán. These groups will support the citizenry’s understanding of the nature and methods of authoritarian legalism. Democracy promotion efforts through NGOs, as well as the breaking of the media stranglehold Orbán has through the funding of local independent news agencies, are particularly effective in both educating and raising awareness. These types of efforts aren’t novel either, the U.S. used to fund independent news agencies in Hungary through USAID. Though it must be noted that this type of funding is particularly vulnerable to foreign agents legislation. This type of legislation labels any entity with ties to “undesirable” countries, organizations, etc., as also undesirable, thereby restricting them in a variety of ways, including financial and administrative restriction and facing stigmatization. Hungary already has such legislation passed in 2023 and strengthened in 2025.

The second objective must be to increase political efficacy, the extent to which an individual feels they can impact the function and behavior of their government. This can in-part be accomplished via the education and awareness efforts mentioned previously. But this can also be accomplished through small victories, proving to those without faith that there is hope. These victories do not need to be grand in scale and can range from getting a candidate elected to parliament to creating a space for people to volunteer and participate in political campaigns or simply by organizing a protest. The increasingly popular opposition party Tisza, Respect and Freedom Party, will hopefully turn out to be a perfect example of this, as it aims to take advantage of Orbán’s dip in popularity. While none of these methods alone are enough, they allow individuals to participate in parts of the process from which they feel removed. As these efforts gain momentum, the scale of this participation will rise, giving these movements individuals, pieces of legislation, and organizations to look at, feel proud of, and most importantly, feel compelled to support and participate in. If a student is surrounded by colleagues volunteering in political campaigns, they too will be more likely to look for ways to participate themselves. This rationale extends to every member of society.

The final piece of the puzzle is speed. The efforts outlined previously, both within Hungary and the EU, must begin quickly and forcefully. The longer Hungarians wait to start combating authoritarian legalism, the more difficult the fight becomes. Civil society, experts, and common citizens, within and outside of Hungary, must be alert and ready to react to attacks on their constitution.

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