Illinois Global Review

Whether the European Union ought to militarize has been hotly contested since the 1950s. The topic is perhaps more salient than ever, as Donald Trump’s isolationist proclivities threaten US-EU defense agreements. Compounding this uncertainty is Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which renders war once again a tangible threat in mainland Europe. In this context, it appears the notion of an EU military has legs: European countries are, by NATO-influenced design, ill-equipped to defend themselves absent US backing. However, given logistical challenges in attempting to implement a federalized military body, it is highly improbable that a unified EU military will come to fruition amidst present circumstances. Conditionality is key here, as it should be noted that the seeds for such an institution have been planted in relevant treaties. To water those seeds, though, European geopolitical context must change for the worse. In the event of a potentially existential security threat, the logic of cooperation appears intuitive. History has demonstrated the willingness of these countries to unite in favor of the common good, and I struggle to envisage why military cooperation is the exception. Under properly motivating circumstances, these countries can and should federalize military function.

Seeking EU expertise, I consulted Dr. Konstantinos Kourtikakis, Associate Professor of Political Science with a concentration in EU studies. He suggested that faltering US aid - such as Trump’s threats to pull out of NATO, should the President act on them - may be the catalyst which promotes military integration. The creation of the Euro, he argued, serves as a relevant historical example: “Every time the US pulls out of the relationship, then the EU does something on its own; the classic example of that is the Euro. […] Previously, the US and EU currencies maintained a stable exchange rate. In the context of the 1970s oil crisis, the US did not want to support a stable exchange rate, which granted impetus for the Euro.”

European countries are not, and have never been, helpless US lap dogs. If a need for self-sufficiency is evident, these nations have demonstrated both a willingness and ability to enact remedial change. Integrally, political context dictates both the possibility and desirability of political outcomes. Given further Russian aggression and faltering US reliability in international agreements, context may, as it did with the nexus of a common currency, force the EU’s hand on the defense issue.

Kourtikakis further relayed that the architecture to do so is pre-established: there exists, in the Treaty of Lisbon, a mutual defense clause which provides that if a Member State is the target of armed aggression on its territory, other Member States are obliged to aid and assist it by all available means. “[The clause] cannot be enforced because there is no military right now to enforce it,” he elaborated. If understood as placing actionable deployment potential behind a pre-existent defense framework, the construction of an integrated EU military body does not appear so far-fetched, particularly when accounting for ever-increasing institutional federalization. As a concrete example of said collaboration, consider the European Defense Fund, which financially supports companies in EU Member States in their development of defense technologies and equipment. Since institutional European defense cooperation is already underway, the question of potential can debatably be quantified.

Determining whether these countries “should” militarize is different, insofar as it becomes a matter of opinion. I contend that the logic in support of federalized military function is sound, however. As their economic and infrastructural ties have proven, these countries are stronger together than they are separately. It stands to reason that an existential threat, should one materialize, would be most effectively combated under a banner of cooperation; a joining of minds, strategists, and technologies, would allow each participatory state to compensate for one another’s limitations, in much the same way international trade facilitates economic prosperity. The development of a unified EU currency was at one point nearly as unconscionable as a unified military, but these nations cooperated because it was the logical thing to do. Actors within international relations can generally be trusted to do the rational thing, where the exceptions in this case perhaps prove the rule. These countries should, if existentially necessary, integrate military function because it is the logical thing to do.

Do I expect a unified EU military body to form overnight in the event of geopolitical catastrophe? Of course not - working out the kinks in the system, after these countries have surmounted all barriers to agreement in the first place, would inevitably take years. That is part of the trouble. By the time the framework for such an institution is finalized, whatever threat which catalyzed its construction will likely be long gone. Predicting events within global politics is notoriously tricky, however, and the future is unknowable. All I can maintain is that cooperation is beneficial, and that EU countries are demonstrably willing to do so given sufficiently urgent need. I will concede also that my argument is predicated on the assumption of an existential catalyst. I do not claim to know that such an event will transpire, only that if it does, the conditions most favorable for the development of an integrated EU military body will have been met. Hopefully it does not come to that, but you will forgive me if I remain skeptical of the idea that war is no longer a concern in any part of the world, Europe included. As such, I assert not only the viability of an EU military, but the potential necessity.